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Recent “Brexit news” has focussed on the fact that the EU has 
pushed back against UK proposals to permit some automotive 
componentry from Japan and Turkey as “local content”. Although 
such “diagonal cumulation” is not unprecedented in trade agreements, 
it is hardly a universal norm either[1]. 
This immediately called to mind one of the panels at our Annual 
Conference last week, which considered the prospects for 
manufacturing. Professor Bailey of Birmingham Business School 
noted that manufacturing was likely to be the sector hardest hit by 
Brexit, a point reiterated by his colleague Professor Ortega-Argilés. 
This is undoubtedly a point of concern in a region where 
manufacturing and services related to it account for almost one-third 
of economic activity (again pointed out by both). 
Whilst the primary problem will vary by sector, a wide range of 
manufacturing industries will be hit, particularly in a no-deal scenario. 
For the automotive sector, tariffs are a particular threat, whereas for 
aerospace the threats are different. Indeed, as pointed out by 
Professor Bailey and Ian Henry of AutoAnalysis (and a Visiting 
Professor here at the Centre for Brexit Studies), in the case of the 
automotive sector there is the added challenge of low local content 
(unless trade partners agree a deal that includes cumulation). 
Even in the event of a last-minute agreement between the UK and 
EU, this problem will not go away. Firms will need to be able to 
demonstrate the origin of parts, yet at present firms often have very 
poor visibility of their supply chains (in contrast to aerospace, where 
for safety reasons, understanding of the entire supply chain is much 
better). Insofar as this information exists, it is not held centrally or in 
systems that could be easily integrated. 
Ian Henry also pointed out the challenges that customs checks will 
present for just-in-time processes that have been honed over many 
years. He suggested that these non-tariff barriers might be the 
equivalent of anywhere between ad-valorem tariffs of 1.5% and 9% 
according to a plethora of studies. In spite of the uncertainty, there are 
reasons to believe that due to the complexity of supply chains, the 
automotive sector would fall at the higher end of this spectrum. 
It is not as simple as re-routing traffic – the nature of freight transport 
(roll-on, roll-off vs. lift-on, lift-off) and vehicle capacities will all need to 
be considered. Panellists were unanimous that they don’t see an 
upside to manufacturing, regardless of the form of Brexit, although 
they viewed a trade agreement as vastly preferable to “no deal” for 
manufacturers. 
Amongst manufacturers, Professor Bailey noted that there was a 
spectrum of severity, depending on the nature of changes. Food & 
drink manufacturing was particularly exposed given its high 
dependence on both trade (and high tariffs in the absence of a trade-
deal) and migrant labour. EU countries provide a significant proportion 
of the workforce in parts of the sector. 
This was reiterated by Professor Ortega-Argilés, who pointed out that 
even if its viability wasn’t ultimately threatened there would be price 
increases (over 5%) and that increases in intermediate costs would 
erode any benefits that one might imagine would accrue to domestic 
producers from higher prices. Moreover, she noted that around 8.9% 
of the service sector’s GDP in the West Midlands would be impacted 
by Brexit. This poses a major challenge. 
Indeed, she suggested that Brexit would ultimately have a larger 
impact on GDP in the West Midlands than the pandemic. In the event 
of a successful vaccine, much of the pandemic-induced fall in GDP 
will be reversed. This is not true of Brexit, where annual GDP might 
be in the region of 6-9% lower than it otherwise might have been. In 
addition, regions like the West Midlands will have to bear persistent 
restructuring costs (in the West Midlands this is likely to fall 
particularly heavily on the automotive sector and related industries). 
Brexit and Covid were thus seen by panellists as a toxic combination, 
with each having distinct impacts that interact. The pandemic has 
forced business services into a dramatic attempt to restructure and a 
shortage of ICT skills is clearly a challenge (particularly for smaller 
firms). Yet the additional bureaucracy of Brexit will hinder productivity. 
The understandable focus on Covid has meant that we are not 
considering the impact of Brexit on longer-term productivity. 
Jack Dromey MP presented evidence from a network of SMEs, 
sounding a note of alarm over the scale of redundancies. Again, he 
noted that Brexit and Covid are seen as a toxic combination and there 
are frustrations over the (small) scale of investment relative to France 
and Germany. He noted that greater devolution and a reallocation of 
(public sector) capital spending by population would go some way to 
ameliorating these problems. 
Ian Henry noted that, in the event of a “no deal” outcome, the 
optimum solution might be to continue trying to get a trade deal (a late 
trade deal is better than a non-existent one). Mass-market 
manufacturers are likely to be heavily affected and EU tariffs will 
probably make UK production unviable. Some 90% of production from 
Ellesmere Port (Vauxhall), 85% from Burnaston (Toyota) and over 
65% of production from Sunderland (Nissan) is exported to the EU. 
Whilst not a substitute to demand from the EU, it was suggested that 
some direct intervention might help. This could be done via 
procurement rules or incentives to use UK-built vehicles in the public 
and regulated sectors. The need for a major UK battery factory was 
also noted. 
In short, there was consensus that any form of Brexit that took the UK 
outside of the Single Market (and, especially, the Customs Union) 
would be quite damaging for the advanced manufacturing sector. 
However, it was also made clear that the extent of this would depend 
critically on the precise form of agreement negotiated with the EU. 
Most manufacturers in the sectors considered had limited ability to 
pivot to serving other markets, making plant closures a more likely 
option. It was felt that the long-term ramifications of these would be 
substantially greater than those of the pandemic. There is therefore 
clearly a lot of work to be done in a very short time in terms of 
negotiating a satisfactory agreement. 
[1] The criteria for assessing rules of origin are actually quite complex, 
particularly where cumulation is involved. Indeed, whether goods can 
be cumulated or not will depend on the precise form of cumulation 
negotiated and this can differ according to the specific product code. 
For interested readers, the UK Trade Observatory have produced 
quite a nice summary of the main issues and 
challenges: https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/publications/were-going-
to-make-them-an-offer-they-can-refuse-rules-of-origin-and-the-uk-eu-
free-trade-agreement/ 
 
